Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy by Bee-Yan Aw
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy
Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Baldwin, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press, 1991
Volume ISBN: 0-226-03569-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/bald91-1
Conference Date: March 16-17, 1990
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: Estimating the Effect of Quantitative Restrictions in Imperfectly
Competitive Markets: The Footwear Case
Chapter Author: Bee-Yan Aw
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6714
Chapter pages in book: (p. 201 - 218)7  Estimating the Effect of 
Quantitative Restrictions in 
Imperfectly Competitive 
Markets: The Footwear Case 
Bee-Yan Aw 
7.1  Introduction 
Over the past decade and a half, U.S. manufacturing industries have come 
under increasing pressure to adjust to forces of change in the world economy. 
The rapid rate of growth of imports from the developing and newly industrial- 
ized countries (NICs), in particular, has given greater significance to the ques- 
tion of import competition. The NICs’ explosive export growth in such labor- 
intensive and thus “sensitive” (from a developed country viewpoint) industries 
as footwear, clothing, and electronics has led to impositions and renewals of 
trade policies aimed at protecting domestic U.S. producers in these industries. 
The most popular of these policies is the voluntary export restraint (VER). A 
VER is a quantitative restriction imposed on the exports of  selected foreign 
suppliers and is administered by  the exporting country. VERs have limited 
U.S.  imports of  textiles and clothing, footwear, autos, carbon and some spe- 
cialty steel, and machine tools. 
There is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature looking at 
the upgrading effect  of  VERs  as well as their effect on import prices  and 
hence, implicitly, the welfare of the importing country.  I  Little, however, has 
been done to model empirically the effect of a VER on the domestic industry 
that the policy is aimed at protecting. While a VER, like any trade-distorting 
instrument, has its obvious economic costs, its beneficiaries, at least in prin- 
ciple, are the domestic producers of the constrained import. The VER  also 
directly affects the foreign producers whose exports are being constrained. 
Bee-Yan Aw is an assistant professor of economics at the Pennsylvania State University. 
1. For theoretical work on the effect of  VERs, see Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez (1979). For 
empirical work  related to this issue, see Anderson (1985), Aw  and Roberts (1986,  1988). and 
Feenstra (1984). 
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The primary goal of  this paper is to examine the actual effects of the VER on 
domestic producers  and compare these with the effects on foreign producers 
of footwear. 
In the empirical literature on international trade, the conventional approach 
to modeling the demand and supply of a traded  good is to assume that the 
market under consideration  is perfectly competitive.  In reality, relatively few 
markets for manufactured goods and services meet the assumptions of perfect 
competition.  Although there has been considerable development in the theory 
of trade under imperfect competition  in the last decade, the same cannot be 
said about empirical work on trade in imperfectly competitive markets. Help- 
man and Krugman (1989) offers a synthesis of the new theory of trade policy 
that arises specifically from the presence of imperfect competition. They con- 
clude that allowing for imperfectly competitive markets leads to nonstandard 
impacts  of  trade policy  and that  the evaluation of  trade policy  should take 
imperfect competition into account from the start. 
This paper utilizes an empirical model of  the footwear industry in which 
imperfect competition is allowed. It proceeds to quantify the effect of the VER 
on footwear from the perspective of  U.S. footwear producers.  Drawing from 
recent tools developed in the industrial organization literature, the traditional 
approach assuming perfect competition  is generalized to allow for imperfect 
competition in the market for U.S. domestic footwear over the  1974-85  pe- 
riod. A simultaneous equation model of demand and supply is specified and 
estimated for domestic footwear. The generalized supply relation allows us to 
identify deviations from competitive pricing in this market. 
The U.S.  footwear VER offers domestic footwear producers protection by 
directly raising price of domestic output as a result of the supply constraint. 
In addition, by limiting competition, the VER could lead to or enhance non- 
competitive behavior by domestic footwear producers, enabling these produc- 
ers to charge or alter the markup over the competitive prices in the market.2 
Thus, in the domestic market, deviations from competitive pricing may differ 
during the VER and non-VER periods. The empirical model developed in this 
paper allows us to estimate the effect of  the supply constraint on domestic 
price and any change in price due to changes in noncompetitive behavior. 
The traditional conclusions about the effects of trade policies on perfectly 
competitive foreign firms also breaks down when these firms are in fact not 
c~mpetitive.~  The issues of the pricing behavior of foreign firms and the effect 
of  the VER on import prices are examined in Aw (1991), which focuses on 
U.S. imports of footwear from Taiwan. Even with the VER in place, Taiwan’s 
2. This is a familiar argument: that protection of domestic industries is anticompetitive, allow- 
ing domestic firms to  increase their markups at the expense of domestic consumers. The extent of 
this anticompetitive effect depends both on the form as well as the level of protection. Bhagwati 
(1969) shows that quotas in some sense are more anticompetitive than tariffs. 
3.  As Helpman and Krugman (1989) show, if tariffs or quotas are applied against foreign firms 
with market power, the importing country may gain by  recapturing some of the monopoly rents 
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exports to the United States in  1980 were more than triple those of the next 
largest foreign ~upplier.~  Results on the effects of  the VER  in the domestic 
footwear market are compared and contrasted with those for Taiwanese foot- 
wear exporters in Aw  (  199  1  ). 
The empirical results from this paper suggest that the direct effect of  the 
VER on the U.S. domestic footwear price is significantly different from zero 
but small. The VER  is associated with a 5 percent increase in the price of 
domestic footwear in contrast to a 22 percent increase in the price of imported 
footwear from Taiwan. On the supply side, the parameters representing the 
index of  competitiveness are not significantly different than zero, implying 
that domestic footwear producers priced competitively during both the non- 
VER  and VER  periods. Taiwanese footwear exporters also priced competi- 
tively during the unconstrained period. Overall, while the VER did result in 
higher footwear prices, the footwear market in the United States is character- 
ized by competitive pricing behavior on the part of both foreign and domestic 
suppliers, even during the constrained period. 
Section 7.2 contains information of  the changing condition of  the U.S. 
footwear industry and the context in which the VER was granted to the indus- 
try. In section 7.3 the empirical model used to estimate the different effects of 
the VER on the domestic market is developed. Section 7.4 discusses the nec- 
essary data and estimation techniques and is followed by  a discussion of  the 
empirical results in section 7.5. A summary and conclusions are offered in 
section 7.6. 
7.2  The Footwear Industry 
The features of easy entry and exit, constant technology, and a large num- 
ber of small firms have led economists to assume that the U.S.  footwear in- 
dustry is perfectly competitive. This assumption is often made despite the fact 
that a relatively small number of producers account for a large share of  annual 
U.S. production. In  1976, about a quarter of the firms produced 82 percent of 
the output. 
Footwear production is one of  the relatively labor-intensive, technologi- 
cally  unsophisticated industries in  which developing countries have held  a 
comparative advantage over the developed countries for the past twenty years. 
The less developed countries’ (LDCs’) share of  world footwear exports in- 
creased from  1 1 percent during the mid-1960s to almost 50 percent in 1985, 
with a significant and growing share of  these exports destined for the U.S. 
market. The LDCs’ quantity share of consumption of nonrubber footwear in 
the United States increased from 11 percent in  1971 to about 60 percent in 
1985. By  1980, Taiwan alone accounted for over 40 percent of the total vol- 
4. From the perspective of Taiwan, about 50-70  percent of Taiwan’s footwear exports during 
the sample period were absorbed by the United States. From the U.S. perspective, Taiwan’s share 
of total U.S. footwear imports ranged from 30 to 40 percent in the decade of the 1970s. 204  Bee-Yan Aw 
ume of U.S. footwear imports, an increase of more than 30 percentage points 
since the 1960s (see U.S. International Trade Commission 1981). 
American production of  nonrubber footwear declined 2 1.2 percent from 
1971 to 1976, while the ratio of domestic shipments to U.S. consumption fell 
from 67.2 percent to 53.1 percent in the same period. Average annual employ- 
ment in the industry declined  13.2 percent from  1973 to  1976. Footwear- 
worker wages relative to all- manufacturing employees fell from 66.7 percent 
in 1973 to 62.6 percent in 1976. Thus, the performance indicators during the 
first half of the 1970s show a rapid decline of the domestic industry. 
Consequently, the pressure to grant some form of  protection to the U.S. 
domestic industry was high. In late 1977, VERs were negotiated with Taiwan 
and Korea to restrict their nonrubber footwear exports to the United States 
through 1981. In principle, the VER can offer protection to domestic produc- 
ers by raising prices for imported footwear. Moreover, by  directly limiting 
foreign competition, the VER may enable domestic producers to charge mark- 
ups of price above marginal cost. 
Empirical work on footwear has indicated that the VER-constrained coun- 
tries responded by  substituting into rubber footwear exports and upgrading 
the quality of  the nonrubber footwear exported to the U.S.  market (see Aw 
and Roberts 1986). To the extent that U.S. production concentrated on higher 
quality footwear, the VER led to increased competition for domestic produc- 
ers. Furthermore, the major complaint of U.S. nonrubber footwear producers 
was that the relief provided by the VER was largely negated by import surges 
from noncontrolled sources. These imports rose from  141 million pairs in 
1977 to 225 million in 1978 and 255 million in  1979. It is therefore not clear 
that competition from imports was in fact reduced by the VER. 
7.3  The Empirical Model 
In  this section, we  develop a model of  the domestic footwear market in 
which deviations from perfectly competitive pricing are allowed. The model 
is used to test parametrically the hypothesis of  competitive behavior in the 
market for U.S. domestic footwear over the 1974-85 period and to quantify 
the markup over marginal cost that accrues to U.S. footwear producers from 
the imposition of the VER. 
The purpose of the model developed here is to estimate simultaneously an 
industry’s demand and supply relations in the context of imperfect competi- 
ti~n.~  For this purpose we extend an empirical model formulated by  Appel- 
baum (1982) for testing various hypotheses about noncompetitive behavior by 
explicitly incorporating the effect of VERs in order to empirically analyze the 
domestic footwear market. 
5. An overview of the empirical techniques that have been applied in this area is provided by 
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Consider a noncompetitive industry producing a homogeneous output Q 
that faces an inverse market demand schedule 
(1)  P = D (Q,  3, 
where P is the price of Q and Z represents the exogenous variables that shift 
the demand function. Let the producers’ cost function be represented by 
(2)  C = C(Q,  w), 
where W are exogenous variables such as input prices or fixed factors of pro- 
duction. While the cost function (2) contains all the information on the firm’s 
technology, more precise parameter estimates can be obtained by  including 
additional equations summarizing the firm’s input choice. A set of estimable 
factor demand equations can be  derived  from  (2) by  applying Sheppard’s 
Lemma, 
(3)  X  = dC(Q, w)ldW 
where X is the vector of input demands. 
When producers are not price takers in the output market, the generalized 
supply relationship is represented by  the equality of  marginal revenue and 
marginal cost. This can be written as 
(4) 
where q is the price elasticity of  market demand and 0 is the index of  the 
degree of competitiveness in the domestic market. The markup of price over 
marginal cost depends on both the elasticity of demand and a market structure 
parameter 0 which varies between zero (perfect competition) and unity (mo- 
nopoly). Bresnahan (1989) explains the equivalence between this form and 
the markup commonly derived from a homogeneous product oligopoly model 
using conjectural variations. 
This model is applied to the U.S. domestic footwear industry for the sample 
period  1974-85.  From  1977 to  1981, the United States imposed VERs on 
footwear imports from Taiwan and Korea. The. model is modified to take into 
account the effect of  the VER on both the demand and supply sides. Under 
imperfect competition, a trade policy such as a VER may alter the markup of 
price over marginal cost. 
The demand function is estimated in log-linear form and written as 
(5)  In P, = yo + y, In  Q, + y2  In GDP, + y3  In I, + 5  D, + E,, 
where P, and Q, are the price and quantity indexes of domestic footwear in 
period t.  GDP, is per capita U.S.  real gross domestic product, I, is a price 
index of U.S. imports of footwear, while D, is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of zero during the non-VER years and unity during the VER years. 
It is important that the functional form chosen in estimating marginal cost 
0 
11 
P (1 - -)  = dC(Q, w)/dQ, 206  Bee-Yan Aw 
not place severe restrictions on these estimates. The translog cost function 
satisfies this criteria, since it places no a priori restrictions on the first or sec- 
ond derivatives of  the cost function. Due to data availability, the empirical 
function estimated is a short-run cost function. Labor and materials are vari- 
able inputs purchased in competitive markets and capital is fixed. The short- 
run cost function is assumed to take the translog form 
(6)  In VC,  = 6,,  + 6,  In PL, + 6,  In  K, + 6,  lnQP  + (3  6LL 
In  PL, In PL, + (3  6,,  In  K,  In K, + (-5)  S,,  In QP  In QP  + SLK  In PL, 
In  K, + a,,  In  PL, In  QP  + 6,,  In  QP  In K,, 
where VC,  is normalized variable cost (measured as the ratio of the sum of 
labor and material costs to the price of materials), Qp,  is the output produced 
in period t, PL, is the price of labor relative to the price of materials, and K,  is 
the volume of capital stock.6 
From (6), the marginal cost of footwear output is given by 
(7)  -  -  Er  (6,  + 6,,  ln QP + s,,  ln PL, + sQK  In  KJ. 
aQP  QP 
The labor demand equation, written in cost-share form, can be constructed 
from (6): 
- S, = 6,  +  In  PL, + 6,  In K, + a,,  In QP, 
alnVC 
ainPL, 
(8)  -’  - 
where S, is labor’s share of the total expenditure on variable inputs. 
Finally, (4), the supply equation, can be written as 
(9) 
avc,  e  p=-  (1 -  -)-I. 
JQ,  T 
Substituting the expression for marginal cost (eq. [7])  into (9) yields 
PQ, -  e 
vcr  T 
(10) 
~  - (6,  + tiQQ  In  QP  + 6,,  In PL, + S,,  In  KJ(1 - -I-’  , 
which expresses the ratio of revenue to total variable cost as the product of the 
output-cost elasticity and a markup factor which depends on the demand elas- 
ticity, q,  and 8, the index of the degree of competitiveness. 
Equation (1  1)  modifies (10)  by incorporating the effects of the VER during 
the 1977-81  years of the sample period. 
6. Normalizing the  price of labor and  variable cost by  the price of materials imposes linear 
homogeneity in factor prices on the short-run cost function. 207  Quantitative Restrictions in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
where D, is the dummy variable that equals one during the VER  years and 
zero otherwise and q is the demand elasticity, which equals the inverse of y, 
from the demand equation (5). 
Equation (1 1) allows the competitiveness index for the restricted and unre- 
stricted periods to be estimated parametrically together with the parameters of 
the cost function. A familiar argument is that protection of domestic industries 
may be anticompetitive, allowing domestic producers to increase their mark- 
ups at the expense of  domestic consumers. Bhagwati (1969) argues that the 
degree of anticompetitiveness is higher with a quantitative restriction like a 
VER than with tariffs. The complete estimating system for the U.S. domestic 
footwear industry consists of the market demand equation (5),  short-run cost 
function (6), labor share equation (8), and the output supply equation (1  1). 
From this set of equations we can estimate the effect of the VER on the price 
of domestic footwear as well as on the degree of competitiveness in the do- 
mestic footwear market. 
7.4  Data 
The basic data set to be  analyzed consists of  observations on prices and 
quantities of  domestic U.S. footwear from  1974 to  1985. This section de- 
scribes the measurement and specification of  these variables as well  as the 
exogenous variables in the demand and supply relations in the U.S. domestic 
market. 
The price and quantity of  domestic and imported footwear are measured 
using index number techniques that avoid the well-known bias contained in 
unit-value indexes. The enhanced incentive to upgrade the quality of the im- 
port bundle when a VER  is imposed and the spillover effect on producers of 
the competing domestic product make it important to account for changes in 
the underlying mix of commodities in the domestic and import bundles over 
time. This paper relies on Tornqvist price indexes (see Aw  and Roberts 1986) 
to control for these changes. The value and volume data needed to construct 
the price and quality indexes for domestic footwear are from the NBER four- 
digit manufacturing Productivity  Database,  1958-86,  which reports value 
and price of  shipments for five product categories of  footwear. The import 
price index in the demand equation for the domestic market is based on the 
footwear exports  of  the  six  major  U.S. suppliers-Taiwan,  Korea,  Italy, 
Spain, Brazil, and Hong Kong. 
In the domestic market, there are three exogenous variables in the demand 
equation (5). GDP,, the U.S.  gross domestic product in real terms per capita, 
is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 1986. The price 
of the  substitute to the domestic output, I,, consists of  the Tornqvist price 
indexes of  footwear imports from Italy,  Spain, Taiwan,  Korea,  and  Hong 
Kong and is based on data obtained from the Census Bureau’s US.  General 
Imports: General and for Consumption, Schedule A, FT 135 (1974-85).  This 
publication reports values and quantities of  U.S. footwear imports by  desti- 208  Bee-Yan Aw 
nation countries disaggregated into thirteen seven-digit product categories. 
The third exogenous variable in equation (5) is the dummy variable indicating 
the presence, or absence of the VER. 
The exogenous variables in the domestic producers’ cost function, namely, 
total output of footwear production QP,  input prices for labor and materials, 
and capital stock data, are all obtained from the NBER Productivity Data- 
base. 
7.5  Estimation Results 
The domestic market model is estimated for the sample period  1974-85 
using the three-stage least squares estimator. The endogeous variables are the 
price and quantity of domestically produced footwear. 
7.51  Domestic Market Estimates 
The parameter estimates for the demand and supply functions for the do- 
mestic footwear market are presented in table 7.1. Two main inferences can 
be drawn from these estimates concerning the effects of the voluntary export 
restraint imposed on footwear imports from Taiwan  and Korea.  Firstly, the 
indexes representing the degree of  competitiveness (0s) do not differ signifi- 
cantly from zero during the non-VER or the VER years. This suggests that the 
Table 7.1  Parameter Estimates for the Demand and Supply of U.S. Footwear 































-  ,638 
-  1.254 
,258 
,053 










(  .004)*  * 
(2.847)* 
(  .028)* 
(  .349)** 
(  .072)** 
(  .021)* 
*Rejects the hypothesis that the parameter equals zero at the 0.05 significance level using  the 
two-tail test. 
**Rejects the hypothesis that the parameter equals zero at the 0.01 significance level using the 
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Table 7.2  Mean Marginal Cost, Price, and Markup 
~ 
Years  Marginal Cost  Price  Markup 
1974-76  $4.442  $4.698  .056% 
1977-8 1  $6.153  $6.545  .0637% 
1982-85  $7.311  $7.858  .0748% 
domestic footwear market  was  competitive not  only during the period  in 
which footwear imports were unrestricted but also during the VER  period. 
Perhaps the fact that the VER was country-specific and that footwear imports 
surged from unrestricted sources meant that competitive pressures from im- 
ports continued to prevail despite the VER. Consequently, the price of domes- 
tic footwear generally reflects marginal cost throughout the sample period. 
This becomes clear from examining the trend of  marginal cost estimates 
and price over the three subperiods (pre-VER, 1974-76,  during VER, 1977- 
81, and post-VER, 1982-85)  in table 7.2. The price per pair of  shoes aver- 
aged $4.7 before 1977 and rose by almost 40 percent to $6.6 during the VER 
years. After the VER, footwear price rose by  20 percent to reach $7.9 over 
1982-85. These price increases are matched very closely by increases on the 
cost side. Estimates of  the supply parameters in table 7.1 indicate that these 
increases are significantly related to increases in labor costs. Marginal cost 
per pair of  shoes rose by  39 percent from an average of $4.4 in 1974-76  to 
$6.2 during the VER  period. This rate of  increase tapered off  to 19 percent 
during the 1982-85  subperiod when the marginal cost averaged $7.3 per pair. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the markup, calculated as the ratio of the 
difference in the price and marginal cost to price per pair of shoes, is small (6 
to 7 percent) and does not vary significantly across the subperiods. 
The second inference from table 7.1 concerns the price effect of the VER 
as reflected in the parameter estimate for 6 in the demand equation. By raising 
the price of  imports which substitute for domestic footwear, the VER  shifts 
up the demand curve for the latter and thus raises its price. The results indicate 
that this demand side effect is significantly different than zero and is slightly 
above 5 percent. 
Except for the parameters measuring the competitiveness index and the cap- 
ital stock, the other parameters in the supply and demand equations are signif- 
icantly different from zero. The first-order parameters in the cost function all 
carry the expected signs. The elasticity of  supply of  domestic footwear is 
estimated at 1.6. 
The inverse of  the demand parameters, y,,  y2,  and y3  reflect the average 
price, income, and cross-price elasticities of  demand for domestic footwear 
respectively, and are given in table 7.3. The demand elasticities for domestic 
footwear with respect to its own price and the price of imported footwear are 
estimated at -  1.57 and 3.87, respectively. These estimates suggest that pur- 
chases of domestic footwear are generally more sensitive to changes in its own 210  Bee-Yan Aw 
Table 7.3  Mean Elasticities for Domestic and Imported Footwear' 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Domestic  Imports 




( ,021  )* 
Income  - .80 
Cross-price  3.87 








( .044)*  * 
*Rejects the hypothesis that the parameter equals zero at the 0.05 significance level using the 
two-tail test. 
**Rejects the hypothesis that the parameter equals zero at the 0.01 significance level using the 
two-tail test. 
price and the price  of  imported  footwear than  previously  thought.  In their 
work on the footwear industry, Bale and Mutti (1981) estimated that the own 
and cross-price elasticities for domestic footwear from 1947 to 1972 are -  .7 
and .7, respectively. The negative sign on the income variable in the demand 
equation suggests that footwear is an inferior good.? 
7.5.2  Contrasting the Domestic and Import Markets 
In this section comparisons  are made between  the empirical estimates on 
the domestic market in this paper with those in the market for Taiwanese foot- 
wear imports analyzed in Aw (1991). 
Aw  (1991) estimated a model of Taiwanese export supply of high and low- 
quality footwear to the United  States allowing for imperfect competition in 
that market. However, unlike the model for the U.S. industry where the avail- 
ability of better cost data permits a more straightforward identification of mar- 
ket power, identification  of  the degree of competitiveness for Taiwanese ex- 
porters  involves an appropriate  specification  of the  market demand curve.8 
The empirical estimates on the market for U.S. imports from Taiwan used in 
this section are based on the estimation of  a simplified single-quality version 
of Aw's model. 
Estimates on the supply side of the import market model indicate that, like 
their domestic counterpart, prices of Taiwanese footwear exports to the United 
States  were  priced  competitively  during  the  unconstrained  period  of  the 
7. This result appears odd in  light of  the high cross-price elasticity and the positive income 
elasticity for shoes imported from Taiwan reported later. As  suggested by  the discussant of this 
paper, despite the use of the Tornqvist price index to account for quality changes, it is possible 
that not all of these changes have been fully expunged from the data. 
8. More specifically, the demand function has to fulfill certain nonseparability conditions. 211  Quantitative Restrictions in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
  ample.^ However, in contrast to the small price effect of the VER on the price 
of domestic footwear of 5 percent, there was a markup of about 22 percent on 
the price of Taiwanese footwear exports to the United States due directly to 
the supply restriction created by the VER. This figure represents the scarcity 
premium for a quota ticket in Taiwan, since the Tornqvist price index used to 
obtain the estimate corrects for any quality upgrading of  the import bundle 
due to the VER. This percentage is at least double the estimate of 7-1  1 percent 
given by the Taiwanese Footwear Manufacturers Association. 
Estimates of  mean own-price, income, and cross-price elasticities of  de- 
mand for U.S. imports from Taiwan are reported in the second column of table 
7.3. The average own-price elasticity of demand for Taiwanese imports is es- 
timated at -  2.6. This is not only much higher than the estimate for the do- 
mestic market counterpart but exceeds most previous estimates of the respon- 
siveness of imported U.S. footwear.'O The cross-price elasticity is 6, implying 
that imports are very responsive to changes in the price of the domestic sub- 
stitute. On the other hand, the income elasticity in the import market is 1.36 
and statistically significant. This figure is considerably less than the previous 
estimates of 5.2 by Szenberg, Lombardi, and Lee. (1977) and 2.5 by Bale and 
Mutti (1981). Taken together with the estimate of  income elasticity for the 
domestic market, these results suggest that the demand for footwear in  the 
U.S. is not as sensitive to changes in income as previously thought. 
7.6  Summary and  Conclusions 
The theory that free trade is not optimal in imperfectly competitive indus- 
tries has increasingly been used to argue for government intervention in inter- 
national trade. The results from this paper indicate that the justification for the 
imposition of the VER  on footwear imports must lie in sources other than 
imperfect competition. There was competitive pricing behavior on the part of 
both domestic and foreign producers of  footwear throughout the sample pe- 
riod. The distortion arising from the deviation of price from marginal cost in 
this industry was the result of the pure scarcity effect of the VER. 
The results from this paper indicate that the direct effect of the VER on the 
price of domestic footwear, while significant, was much smaller than that on 
the price of the imported counterpart from Taiwan. The restraint on Taiwanese 
and Korean footwear exports resulted in a 5 percent increase in the price of 
domestic footwear but a 22 percent scarcity premium for Taiwanese exporters. 
On the supply side, domestic footwear producers priced competitively not 
9. Given that the VER on Taiwanese footwear was binding, the degree of competition in the 
output market does not matter during the constrained period. 
10. For example, these estimates range from -  1.33 in U.S. International Trade Commission 
(1977)  to -  1.5  in Szenberg et al. (1977). However, Bale and Mutti (1981) estimated theelasticity 
tobe -3.1. 212  Bee-Yan Aw 
only during the non-VER period but  when imports from Taiwan and Korea 
were restricted. Such competitive pricing behavior was probably the conse- 
quence of the availability of close substitutes from numerous U.S. suppliers 
and the existence of many noncontrolled foreign suppliers. 
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Comment  Keith E. Maskus 
Bee-Yan  Aw’s  paper is a nice example of  how  we  can advantageously use 
straightforward partial-equilibrium models  and  sensible econometric tech- 
niques to examine basic questions about the effects of trade policy on domes- 
tic and foreign firms competing in the home market. Her approach is a simple 
modification of the standard textbook model of protection. Consider the home 
market for a standardized and rather homogeneous product, such as footwear, 
facing a high degree of  import competition from price-elastic foreign sup- 
pliers. The modification comes in allowing for two possibilities that are not in 
the simple textbook model. The first possibility is that imported and domestic 
products may be differentiated in some way, allowing us to treat them in sepa- 
rated markets. The second, and related, possibility is that domestic and for- 
eign suppliers may have some power to extract monopoly profits through im- 
perfectly competitive pricing behavior. Aw’s analysis shows that these issues 
may be incorporated analytically without much difficulty and that the payoff 
to doing so in terms of understanding the underlying form of competition can 
be rewarding. 
The main purpose of the paper is to infer the effects of the voluntary export 
restraint (VER) negotiated between the United States and Korea and Taiwan 
on competition and prices in the U.S.  markets for domestic and Korean and 
Taiwanese footwear, One might wonder about the choice of footwear for such 
an analysis, since there is likely to be a strong prior expectation that these 
markets come close to the perfectly competitive extreme. Both the domestic 
and Korean and Taiwanese sources of  supply face strong competition from 
each other and from additional international suppliers. Footwear technology 
is highly standardized and stable so there is little scope for generating any 
dynamic forms of  comparative advantage. Significant import penetration is 
simply the result of  high costs in the U.S. industry.  In  short, the standard 
textbook model is probably the right one for this industry, implying that our 
conventional notions of  the costs and benefits of  trade barriers are also sub- 
stantially correct. 
Nonetheless, in any industry, market structure and the degree of  competi- 
tion are ultimately empirical issues that deserve investigation, as Aw  has com- 
petently done.  Further, as is well known, the imposition of  the VER itself 
could have an impact on competitive behavior in U.S. markets, making it a 
worthy episode for study. In  this context, Aw’s  results are reasonably clear 
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and would, I believe, stand up well to alternative specifications. In particular, 
prior expectations are borne out: the U.S. industry is forced to price competi- 
tively whether or not there is a VER in place against the major foreign sup- 
plier. The VER rents are transferred completely to foreign exporters.  There 
was no strategic rent capture, and the VER clearly worsened the U.S. terms 
of trade. The main benefit of the program was that it offset the cost advantage 
of Taiwanese and Korean footwear suppliers, which presumably  is precisely 
what the U.S.  industry desired. Otherwise, the VER can only be considered 
to have been  harmful to U.S. interests in the most damaging way  possible. 
These results provide a sense of reassurance that economists are not mislead- 
ing their students and themselves about the dangers of protection. After all, if 
Aw  had discovered that the United States had somehow increased its welfare 
by  imposing  a  VER  on an  apparently  competitive  industry,  the profession 
would have been confronted with a surprising, and therefore noteworthy, re- 
sult. 
Thus, Aw’s analysis has confirmed basic expectations, which fact may be 
sufficiently convincing of the correctness of the exercise. However, a few cau- 
tionary  notes must be  sounded before the conclusions  are accepted whole- 
heartedly. These comments relate to both the adequacy of the model for cap- 
turing the true complexities of competition in footwear and to the empirical 
research design. 
Four issues may be raised about aspects of competition in footwear markets 
that go unconsidered here. First, the model lacks any specification of what is 
thought to be the potential source of  imperfect competition among domestic 
and foreign shoe producers. Each industry produces a homogeneous product, 
though there is differentiation  between U.S.  and foreign footwear. In itself, 
this assumption is uncomfortable,  since presumably  differentiation is greater 
across types of shoes (e.g., rubber versus nonrubber or finer classifications of 
characteristics), regardless of geographical source, than across country of ori- 
gin. Aw’s approach is thus reminiscent  of  trade models employing the Ar- 
mington assumption, which has been shown to be of dubious value. The form 
of product differentiation  is, in principle,  significantly related to competitive 
decisions. For example, if  U.S. firms consider their main competition to be 
other U.S. firms, which would be appropriate under the nation-specific differ- 
entiation hypothesis assumed in Aw’s paper, they would likely perceive them- 
selves to have fewer competitors than they would under the product-specific 
differentiation hypothesis with its global supply sources. The VER may then 
induce more, presumably inefficient, entry by U.S. firms in the former case. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, the notion that each national industry produces 
a homogeneous  product leaves little scope for explaining uncompetitive  be- 
havior in the absence of further assumptions about entry barriers or the distri- 
bution of firm sizes and resulting strategic activity. In short, what is supposed 
in this analysis to induce, even potentially, collusive behavior by U.S.  firms? 
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exclusively to consider pricing behavior. It is clear, however, that competitive 
pressures and the imposition of the VER could affect markets equally through 
output responses. No  mechanism for entry, exit, or investment decisions is 
allowed here, which is understandable given the limited amount of data avail- 
able. Nonetheless, as the author notes, the introduction of  a quantitative im- 
port limitation in an imperfectly competitive market could result in greater or 
lower domestic output, depending on the competitive responses. The paper 
finesses this issue by considering only the estimation of a short-run cost func- 
tion with fixed capital stock for the U.S. industry, which practice conditions 
the results of  estimates of price-marginal cost gaps. It is likely that over the 
twelve-year period  considered,  new  investments were undertaken  by  U.S. 
footwear firms, perhaps inefficiently, which would be an interesting question 
for subsequent analysis to consider. 
A third concern is the absence of serious consideration of  additional inter- 
national supply sources. The issue is often raised in the paper but is not dealt 
with satisfactorily due to the strict focus on bilateral competition. The welfare 
effects of  the VER  depend on relevant trade elasticities from other footwear 
sources, both directly and because the behavior of U.S. and Taiwanese firms 
is affected by third-country competition. In the simplest view, it seems likely 
that, in lobbying for the VER, the U.S. industry succeeded only in making 
Taiwanese exporters richer while inviting greater imports from elsewhere, 
with few benefits to themselves. Indeed, in that context one wonders what the 
motivation for the VER, as opposed to, say, a nondiscriminatory tariff, could 
have been in the first place. 
A final competitive issue is perhaps the least relevant for the modeling ex- 
ercise, but an intriguing one all the same. Perhaps an important layer of com- 
petition has been missed here. Specifically, footwear producers in the United 
States, for whose benefit the VER was presumably erected, are not typically 
the final sellers of their products. Footwear retailers sell both American and 
imported products and may be in a position to exploit market power of  their 
own through oligopsonistic procurement. This possibility could be significant 
both in considering the welfare effects of the VER, specifically the disposition 
of  its rents, and in explaining the inability of U.S. producers to raise prices 
above marginal costs. 
Turning to the empirical methods, which are generally sensible given the 
inevitable tradeoffs between analytical rigor and empirical tractability in these 
exercises, several concerns may be voiced as well. First, there are only twelve 
years of data. Yet  sixteen parameters are estimated in one market and eleven 
parameters in the other market, and there is the subsequent desire to make 
inferences about market structure and associated demand and supply elastici- 
ties. Thus, the data are asked to reveal more information than they may legit- 
imately contain. It might have been better to increase the sample size by con- 
sidering some pooling possibilities across several footwear categories, which 
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Second, the simultaneous-equations framework adopted in Aw’s paper is a 
decided improvement over most other empirical efforts in the field of trade 
policy  and imperfect competition. However,  it  is doubtful that all relevant 
relationships have been captured in the model. For  example, it  seems that 
some parameters should be codetermined in principle. Consider 0  (the com- 
petitiveness parameter in the U.S. market), 9  (demand elasticity), and 5  (the 
effect of the VER on demand for domestic footwear). The VER could influ- 
ence not only the size of  the demand for U.S. shoes, but also its elasticity, 
which would in turn affect the competitive behavior of U.S.  producers. Simi- 
larly, since the prices of imported Taiwanese footwear are included in Z,, the 
price index of imported shoes in the U.S. demand equation, the VER on Tai- 
wanese footwear products may  dominate the estimated cross-price demand 
elasticity y3,  implying that y3  and 5  may be codetermined. This latter problem 
could be handled simply by interacting the VER dummy variable with I,. On 
a different plane, it is doubtful that modeling the markets for U.S. and Tai- 
wanese footwear separately adequately captures their interrelationships, even 
allowing for the shift parameter in U.S. demand. 
Third, the markedly different modeling strategies in the two markets are 
hard to understand. Aw  has specified a log-linear demand for U.S. shoes with 
a VER dummy but a “linear” U.S. demand for Taiwanese shoes that incorpo- 
rates an interaction term between imports and the prices of  substitute foot- 
wear.  It is difficult to make meaningful elasticity comparisons across markets 
in this context. At the same time, she has adopted a translogarithmic short- 
run cost function for U.S. producers and a linear long-run cost function for 
Taiwanese producers. There is no explanation for this rather marked concep- 
tual difference between cost structures, a difference that conceivably could 
color the size of the relative markups. 
A final small comment is in order. The author has taken pains to control for 
quality changes in the data in order to focus strictly on price competition. Yet 
a striking result in the paper is that the income elasticity for U.S. shoes is 
negative while that for Taiwanese imports is positive. Could it be that quality 
changes have not been fully expunged from the data? 
Comment  J. David Richardson 
I like the spirit of this paper a great deal: specify an econometric model with 
careful attention to theory, apply it to a data set that the author herself  has 
painstakingly validated for the purpose, and see how  well the specification 
stands up against the data. 
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I find the conclusions from these procedures quite credible. The data sug- 
gest that VERs on  Korean and  Taiwanese footwear exports to the United 
States generated modest rent transfers. The data support no trace of imperfect 
competition in any footwear market, either before or after the VERs. 
I am persuaded that these conclusions are robust, too, given our knowledge 
of the industry’s structure. The paper motivates its search for indications of 
imperfect competition by  observing that 82 percent of  U.S. footwear output 
was produced by one quarter of the firms. But there are a lot of firms in that 
one quarter! So it does not surprise me that the results come out looking pretty 
competitive. 
I was disappointed that the paper itself did not reinforce my  sense of ro- 
bustness that rent transfers would be everything and imperfectly competitive 
effects (on pricekost margins, on  profits, on scale, on entry or exit, etc.) 
would be nil. The paper could have driven home that point by more imagina- 
tive experimentation with alternative specifications. It selects one specifica- 
tion only-and  not a very compelling one at that, because of peculiarities and 
undefended asymmetries. 
I can illustrate what I mean by abstracting from third-country suppliers and 
from other important detail that the paper includes but that is extraneous for 




where p’s are prices, q’s are quantities, and 1 and 2 denote countries whose 
footwear competes as imperfect substitutes; and two marginal cost functions, 
(3) 
(4) 
where c’s are marginal costs. 
This is  where the asymmetries begin. Equation (1) is specified as a log- 
linear function but  (2) is a conveniently nonlinear “linear” function-the 
product plq2  enters linearly and conveniently in addition to other variables, on 
the right-hand side. I would have preferred for close substitutes to have con- 
sistent functional forms. Equation (3) is specified as a translog short-run cost 
function (capital held constant), but (4) is a linear long-run cost function (cap- 
ital costs included on the right-hand side). The author comments soberly at 
one point that “it is important that the functional form chosen in the estimation 
of the cost relation not place severe restrictions on the estimates of marginal 
cost.” But she seems unable to apply the spirit of that rule to (4) for lack of 
data, and unwilling to apply it to (1) and (2) despite the well-known hypersen- 
sitivity of  results in  imperfect competition to the curvature of  the demand 
curve. 
PI  = PI  (419P2, . . .I, 
P2 = P2  (q2’Plt . ’ .)I 
c, = c,  (91, . . .), 
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Another all-important specification question is how  a VER  should enter 
equations (1)-(4). Does it make the constrained supplier’s cost curve vertical 
after a point? Does it introduce a vertical segment to one demand curve, with 
a consequent discontinuity in  its marginal revenue curve? Does it  shift the 
other demand curve, and if so exactly how-horizontally,  linearly, . . . (the 
functional form question again)? The author opts for the first choice alone, 
and leaves it at that. In equation (1 1) of the paper, for example, there seemed 
to be a fairly simple opportunity to allow a VER dummy variable to shift both 
the “degree-of-competition’’ parameter and the demand elasticity. Only the 
former is permitted; the demand elasticity is assumed to be unaffected by  the 
VER. 
There are in addition two questions that the paper leaves peculiarly unre- 
solved. One is whether product differentiation across varieties (rubberhon- 
rubber, and so on) is empirically more important than product differentiation 
across nationalities. The answer provided (in note 8) seems inadequate and at 
variance with common sense; countries produce many overlapping varieties, 
and casual observation suggests that shoe consumers do not put a great deal of 
weight on national origin, say, by comparison with consumers of automobiles 
and other consumer durables. A second unresolved question is whether the 
estimated cross-price elasticity of U.S. demand for imported footwear can 
credibly be 6, while the own-price elasticity is far smaller, and whether do- 
mestic footwear can be  credibly considered an inferior good, as the paper 
maintains. Once again, the paper’s answer seems inadequate. I would have 
appreciated some attention to how  robust these results were  to  alternative 
specifications. 